

for SC&O1 to provide an SIO and take ownership<sup>34</sup>. In his response the following morning Superintendent Sweeney states he has made a decision not to take ownership at that stage but will “clear the ground and then make a proper assessment”.<sup>35</sup> I have seen no evidence of that assessment subsequently being made.

52. The interview of Port on the 27<sup>th</sup> June 2014 was conducted by HAT officers. DCs Holt and Levoir are experienced officers with significant training not only in the conducting of interviews but also, in DC Levoir’s case, as an interview advisor<sup>36</sup>. They should therefore have both recognised that even if their brief was to obtain an account from Port without any challenge, there would at some stage be a further interview when any challenges would be made. This is an expectation of the PEACE model of interviewing (see paragraphs 19 - 20 above).

53. The second interview highlighted a number of inconsistencies between Port’s original statement, his first interview with DC Desai and during the second interview itself. These include:

- His account of the times he went to work which varied between a 2045-0345hrs shift, to a 1400-2200hrs shift but returning for a few hours to conclude at 0345hrs, to a 1400-2200hrs shift and staying at home<sup>37</sup>.
- In his first interview he stated he was scared to go into the bedroom, whereas in the second he said he was surprised to see AW still there<sup>38</sup>.
- He stated that AW had effectively been unconscious since the early hours of Wednesday morning<sup>39</sup>: if this was the case when could AW have “lost/discarded” his phone?
- There are conflicting accounts about phone contact between AW and Port. No checks seem to have been made on Port’s phone even though passcodes were provided.
- No checks were done regarding his contact with others (via Facebook) on Wednesday evening.
- The account of AW being warm and gurgling, suggesting that he was still alive. This is clearly contradicted by the attending

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<sup>34</sup> IPC000753(SMT / HAT email 26.6.14)

<sup>35</sup> MPS000544 (D/Supt Sweeney email 27.6.14)

<sup>36</sup> IPC000417( MG14 DC Holt 26.6.17), IPC000422 (MG14 DC Levoir 27.7.14)

<sup>37</sup> IPC000080 pp 5, 7 (Port first interview 26.6.14) IPC000137 pp.10, 42 & 46 (Port second interview 27.6.14)

<sup>38</sup> IPC000080 pp 5 & 7 (Port first interview 26.6.14) IPC000137 pp.10, 42 & 46(Port second interview 27.6.14)

<sup>39</sup> IPC000137 (Port second interview 27.6.14) pp.38-39, 42

paramedic who puts his body temperature at 24 degrees centigrade, indicating he has been dead for some time.

- The presence of hypostasis, which first led police to considering the death to be suspicious is at odds with Port's account that he had been alive when he moved him outside the flat.
- The fact that Port himself refers to two previous incidents where men have been in his (Port's) company and have either been drugged or been under the influence of drugs to the point of being incoherent<sup>40</sup>.
- The forensic opportunities in the form of the tissues used to clear up the sick and the condoms have been disposed of<sup>41</sup>. If the outside rubbish had not been removed by the time of the interview these could have been recovered. It was not possible to corroborate Port's account.

54. A further review of the interviews would have highlighted the need for further actions to be raised. DC Levoir, as a tier 5 interviewer, could then have prepared the strategy for the subsequent interview which would have been helpful especially as she already had a good understanding of the case. I would have expected further interviews to have taken place.

55. In her statement on the 8<sup>th</sup> July China Dunning was clear that AW would not take drugs when working other than poppers<sup>42</sup>. When the toxicology results were received in August 2014<sup>43</sup> it appears to have been accepted, based upon the account of Port, that AW had administered the GHB himself and had overdosed. Neither AW's friends nor his mother said GHB was a drug he used<sup>44</sup>. China Dunning specifically states that she asked officers about GHB and that he would not use drugs in this situation (i.e. when working as an escort)<sup>45</sup>. There was no evidence that he had purchased it either online or from any other person (at this time AW's computer had not been examined). There was no comprehension that overdoses from GHB were rare. The toxicology results should have prompted some inquisition regarding the drug.

56. The investigation's acceptance that the GHB was self-administered is demonstrated through the lack of further investigative activity after the receipt of the toxicology results. There were no further interviews conducted with Port to challenge his account. The MG3 that was subsequently prepared for the

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<sup>40</sup> Ibid pp. 54-57

<sup>41</sup> Ibid p.30

<sup>42</sup> IPC000319 p.2 (China Dunning statement 8.7.14) and IPC000320 p.4 (China Dunning IOPC statement)

<sup>43</sup> IPC000035 pp. 89-90 (Toxicology results recorded on the CRI)S

<sup>44</sup> IPC000320 (China Dunning IOPC statement), IPC000917 (Kiera Brennan statement), IPC000079 p.3 (FLO log book AW)

<sup>45</sup> IPC000320 (China Dunning IOPC statement)